Tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects

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dc.contributor.author Pal, Rupayan
dc.contributor.author Scrimitore, Marcella
dc.date.accessioned 2016-07-13T07:40:30Z
dc.date.available 2016-07-13T07:40:30Z
dc.date.issued 2016-04
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2275/394
dc.description.abstract In an infinitely repeated Cournot game with trigger strategy punishment, we demonstrate that the relationship between market concentration and collusion sustainability depends on the strength of network externalities. The latter is shown to interact with the number of firms and to affect the profitability of cooperation vs. competition, which delivers the result, challenging conventional wisdom, that lower market concentration can make collusion more stable. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries WP;WP-2016-010
dc.subject Collusion en_US
dc.subject market concentration en_US
dc.subject network effects en_US
dc.title Tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US

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