Will a matchmaker invite her potential rival in?

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dc.contributor.author Pal, Rupayan
dc.contributor.author Ramani, Vinay
dc.date.accessioned 2015-12-04T10:28:25Z
dc.date.available 2015-12-04T10:28:25Z
dc.date.issued 2015-08
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2275/373
dc.description.abstract This paper analyzes optimal strategies of an incumbent intermediary, who matches agents on the two sides of a market, in the presence of entry threat under alternative scenarios. It shows that, when entry is free, strategic entry accommodation is the optimal choice of the incumbent - not entry deterrence, unless the variation in agents' types is small. Entry accommodation remains optimal for the incumbent for a wide range of parametric configurations even when there is a fixed cost of entry. These results are in sharp contrast to the predictions of existing models of entry. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries WP;WP-2015-025
dc.subject Entry accommodation en_US
dc.subject Entry deterrence en_US
dc.subject Intermediation en_US
dc.subject Two-sided market en_US
dc.title Will a matchmaker invite her potential rival in? en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US

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