Impediments to contract enforcement in day labour markets: A Perspective from India

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dc.contributor.author Naraparaju, Karthikeya
dc.date.accessioned 2015-08-17T11:41:59Z
dc.date.available 2015-08-17T11:41:59Z
dc.date.issued 2014-12
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2275/348
dc.description.abstract In developing countries, lack of formal contract enforcement mechanisms is compensated by informal or relational governance enforced through trust, kinship, reputation, etc. This paper focuses on one such setting in India's urban informal economy: the 'day labour' market for casual labour. We survey seven such markets in Navi Mumbai (a city on the outskirts of Mumbai), and find considerable incidence of contract enforcement problems in the form of employers reneging on wage payments to labourers. We find that payments to labourers with access to social networks and a record of work done are less likely to be reneged. Further, consistent with the literature on the limits of relation-based contract enforcement, we find that labourers in large markets, with greater linguistic and caste-based diversity, are more likely to be reneged. We argue that interventions aimed at facilitating access to formal mechanisms might help overcome some of the limitations with relation-based enforcement. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries WP;WP-2014-050
dc.subject Urban informal economy en_US
dc.subject Day labour markets en_US
dc.subject Migrants en_US
dc.subject Contract enforcement en_US
dc.title Impediments to contract enforcement in day labour markets: A Perspective from India en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US

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