Revenue non-equivalence in multidimensional procurement auctions under asymmetry

dc.contributor.author	Chandel, Shivangi
dc.contributor.author	Sarkar, Shubhro
dc.date.accessioned	2015-08-10T11:06:04Z
dc.date.available	2015-08-10T11:06:04Z
dc.date.issued	2014-03
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2275/308
dc.description.abstract	Using an example we show that the Revenue Equivalence in the Scoring Auctions, as postulated by Che (1993), no longer holds when the suppliers are asymmetric in their costs of production.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;WP-2014-008
dc.subject	Auctions	en_US
dc.subject	Public Procurement	en_US
dc.subject	Asymmetric Bidders	en_US
dc.subject	Multidimensional Bids	en_US
dc.title	Revenue non-equivalence in multidimensional procurement auctions under asymmetry	en_US
dc.type	Working Paper	en_US