Managerial delegation in monopoly under network effects

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dc.contributor.author Bhattacharjee, Trishita
dc.contributor.author Pal, Rupayan
dc.date.accessioned 2015-08-05T11:26:04Z
dc.date.available 2015-08-05T11:26:04Z
dc.date.issued 2013-05
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2275/283
dc.description.abstract This paper examines the possibility of emergence of incentive equilibrium in the case of monopoly, without relying on agency theory based arguments. It shows that, when there is network effect of consumption, it is optimal for a monopolist to offer sales-oriented incentive scheme to her manager. The extent of sales-orientation of the optimal incentive scheme is higher in the case of stronger network effect. It also shows that both the monopolist and consumers are better off under managerial delegation than in case of no delegation, unlike as in the case of usual oligopoly without network effect. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries WP;WP-2013-009
dc.subject Incentive equilibrium en_US
dc.subject Managerial delegation en_US
dc.subject Monopoly en_US
dc.subject Network effects en_US
dc.title Managerial delegation in monopoly under network effects en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US

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