Managerial delegation under network effects

dc.contributor.author	Bhattacharjee, Trishita
dc.contributor.author	Pal, Rupayan
dc.date.accessioned	2015-08-05T07:44:14Z
dc.date.available	2015-08-05T07:44:14Z
dc.date.issued	2013-01
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2275/277
dc.description.abstract	This paper shows that network effects do not have any implication to the nature of the equilibrium strategic managerial delegation under Cournot type quantity competition, unlike as in the case of Bertrand type price competition a la Hoernig (2012). It also shows that delegation of output/price decision to the manager is optimal for the owner even in the case of monopoly in the product market, due to the existence of network effects. The monopolist offers sales-oriented incentive scheme to her manager in equilibrium, if there is network effect.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;WP-2013-003
dc.subject	Strategic delegation	en_US
dc.subject	Network effects	en_US
dc.subject	Quantity competition	en_US
dc.subject	Monopoly	en_US
dc.title	Managerial delegation under network effects	en_US
dc.type	Working Paper	en_US