The coordination poblems with banks

dc.contributor.author	Correa, Romar
dc.contributor.other	Money and Finance Conference, 2nd	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2012-06-07T09:50:43Z
dc.date.available	2012-06-07T09:50:43Z
dc.date.issued	2012-06-07
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2275/187
dc.description.abstract	Consider a two-period situation. In the first period a consumer and a firm bargain over the price of a bond. The objective is a project which takes one period to come on stream. Both agents prefer production but the consumer is less patient than the firm. The outcome is underproduction. A condition for the intervention of a bank exists. It is shown that intermediation is unstable. The potentially stabilising role of money is discussed.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en	en_US
dc.subject	Coordination parables	en_US
dc.subject	Stability	en_US
dc.title	The coordination poblems with banks	en_US
dc.type	Article	en_US