Political competition and leadership in tax competition

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dc.contributor.author Pal, Rupayan
dc.contributor.author Sharma, Ajay
dc.date.accessioned 2012-06-04T07:02:16Z
dc.date.available 2012-06-04T07:02:16Z
dc.date.issued 2012-06-04
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2275/151
dc.description.abstract In this paper, we introduce political competition in a sequential move tax competition game between two regions for foreign owned mobile capital. It shows that in case of sequential move, political delegation takes place only in the follower region, not in the leader region. Moreover, political competition need not necessarily lead to higher tax rate in equilibrium. These results are in the sharp contrast to the existing results. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries WP;WP-2011-024
dc.subject Mobile capital en_US
dc.subject Tax competition en_US
dc.subject Political competition en_US
dc.subject Leadership en_US
dc.subject Public good en_US
dc.title Political competition and leadership in tax competition en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US

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