Political competition and leadership in tax competition

dc.contributor.author	Pal, Rupayan
dc.contributor.author	Sharma, Ajay
dc.date.accessioned	2012-06-04T07:02:16Z
dc.date.available	2012-06-04T07:02:16Z
dc.date.issued	2012-06-04
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2275/151
dc.description.abstract	In this paper, we introduce political competition in a sequential move tax competition game between two regions for foreign owned mobile capital. It shows that in case of sequential move, political delegation takes place only in the follower region, not in the leader region. Moreover, political competition need not necessarily lead to higher tax rate in equilibrium. These results are in the sharp contrast to the existing results.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;WP-2011-024
dc.subject	Mobile capital	en_US
dc.subject	Tax competition	en_US
dc.subject	Political competition	en_US
dc.subject	Leadership	en_US
dc.subject	Public good	en_US
dc.title	Political competition and leadership in tax competition	en_US
dc.type	Working Paper	en_US