Rewarding innovation efficiently:  Research spill-overs and exclusive IP rights

dc.contributor.author	Denicoloy, Vincenzo
dc.contributor.author	Franzoni, Luigi A
dc.date.accessioned	2012-06-04T06:16:41Z
dc.date.available	2012-06-04T06:16:41Z
dc.date.issued	2012-06-04
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2275/131
dc.description.abstract	We investigate the conditions for the desirability of exclusive intellectual property rights for innovators, as opposed to weak rights allowing for some degree of imitation and ex-post competition. The comparison between the two alternatives reduces to a specific “ratio test,” which suggests that strong, exclusive IP rights are preferable when competition from potential imitators is weak, the innovation attracts large R&D investments, and research spill-overs are small.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;WP-2011-002
dc.subject	Kaplow test	en_US
dc.subject	Research spill-overs	en_US
dc.subject	Patents and trade secrets	en_US
dc.subject	Independent invention defense	en_US
dc.subject	Mandatory licensing	en_US
dc.title	Rewarding innovation efficiently: Research spill-overs and exclusive IP rights	en_US
dc.type	Working Paper	en_US