How much should you own? Cross-ownership and privatization

dc.contributor.author	Pal, Rupayan
dc.date.accessioned	2012-06-01T10:34:56Z
dc.date.available	2012-06-01T10:34:56Z
dc.date.issued	2012-06-01
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2275/119
dc.description.abstract	This paper examines the interdependence of cross-ownership and level of privatization in case of differentiated products mixed duopoly. It shows that it is optimal for the private firm not to own any (own the entire) portion of the privatized share of its rival firm, if the level of privatization is very low (very high). In equilibrium, the government makes sure that cross-ownership is not attracted. However, in most of the situations, the possibility of cross-ownership adversely affects the prospect of privatization. Results of this paper have strong implications to antitrust regulations and divestment policies.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;WP-2010-015
dc.subject	Cross-ownership	en_US
dc.subject	Mixed Duopoly	en_US
dc.subject	Partial privatization	en_US
dc.subject	Product differentiation	en_US
dc.title	How much should you own? Cross-ownership and privatization	en_US
dc.type	Working Paper	en_US