Delegation and emission tax in a differentiated oligopoly

dc.contributor.author	Pal, Rupayan
dc.date.accessioned	2012-05-31T09:42:23Z
dc.date.available	2012-05-31T09:42:23Z
dc.date.issued	2012-05-31
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2275/103
dc.description.abstract	This paper examines how product differentiation as well as strategic managerial delegation affects optimal emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare, under alternative modes of product market competition. It shows that, under pure profit maximization, the (positive) optimal emission tax rate is not necessarily decreasing in degree of product differentiation, irrespective of the mode of competition. The possibility of emission tax rate to be positive and lower for more differentiated products, under quantity (price) competition, is higher (lower) in case of delegation than that in case of no delegation. It also shows that, under quantity (price) competition, the equilibrium emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare are higher (lower) in case of delegation than that in case of no delegation.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;WP-2009-007
dc.subject	Emission tax	en_US
dc.subject	Price competition	en_US
dc.subject	Product differentiation	en_US
dc.subject	Quantity competition	en_US
dc.subject	Strategic managerial delegation	en_US
dc.title	Delegation and emission tax in a differentiated oligopoly	en_US
dc.type	Working Paper	en_US